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Abstract 
 
This  paper  explores  the  role  of  employment  protection  when  powerful  external  crises  reduce 
demand  for  products.  We  first  present  a  theoretical  framework  that  shows  that  employment 
protection has a U-shaped effect on abnormal unemployment during a negative exogenous shock 
to  an  economy.  Using  data  from  the  33  OECD  countries,  we  analyze  how  the  level  of 
employment  protection  affected  the  stability  of  unemployment  rates  during  the  recent  global 
economic crisis. The  results suggest that countries with an intermediate level of employment 
protection  will  have  more  stable  unemployment  rates  during  a  world  crisis.  The  policy 
implication of our paper is that countries should seek a medium level of employment protection 










   
Introduction 
This  paper  explores  the  role  of  employment  protection  during  a  negative  shock  in 
aggregate  demand.  In  general,  the  conventional  wisdom  says  that  labor  market  regulations 
improve workers' welfare, do not affect employment and have minimal costs (see e.g., Abraham 
and  Houseman,  1994;  Blank  and  Freeman,  1994;  Freeman,  2000).  However,  employment 
protection may have different effects on different types of workers. For example, Malul and Luski 
(2009) and Malul (2009) showed that labor market policies have a different impact on older and 
younger workers. Other studies have demonstrated that the cyclical volatility of employment is 
much more pronounced in those countries with relatively fewer labor regulations than in those 
that are more highly regulated, such as many countries in continental Europe (Bertola and Ichino, 
1995). Tella and MacCulloch (2005) found evidence that increased flexibility in the labor market 
leads to reduce both unemployment rates and rates of long-term unemployment. 
We maintain that employment protection affects economic flexibility, and as a result, in 
times  of  crisis,  has  a  negative  effect  on  growth.  We  base  this  hypothesis  on  findings  from 
previous studies, such as those of Lazear. Lazear (1990) presented a parsimonious model of the 
determinants of the labor market with job security as an independent variable. The model was 
tested  in  a  sample  of  20  countries  using  data  from  1956  to  1984.  The  majority  of  Lazear's 
estimates are from equations that include just the dismissals indicator and the time trend variable, 
rather  than  all  of  the  variables.  Lazear  reports  that  his  measure  of  employment  protection  is 
negatively related to the employment-population ratio and the labor force participation rate, but 
positively associated with unemployment.  Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000) document the high 
level  of  job  security  protection  in  Latin  American  labor  markets  and  analyzes  its  impact  on 
employment. They show that job security policies have a substantial impact on the level and 
distribution of employment in Latin America. Such policies reduce employment and promote 
inequality. The institutional organization of the labor market also affects both employment and   
inequality. Markets where employment protection legislation is more stringent feature more stable 
employment and unemployment. However, in the long run, employment and unemployment are 
not clearly correlated with the stringency of job security provisions (Scarpetta, 1996).  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework that 
analyzes the relationship between the labor market’s level of inflexibility and changes in growth 
(or unemployment) during an exogenous shock to the economic system. In Section 3, we conduct 
an empirical analysis that supports the theoretical framework. Section 4 summarizes the paper and 
presents our conclusions. 
 
The Model 
What is the relationship between the labor market’s level of inflexibility and changes in 
growth (or unemployment) during an exogenous shock to a country’s economy, particularly a 
negative  shock  that  comes,  for  example,  from  a  world  crisis?    To  answer  this  question,  we 
constructed the following model. 
 
Inflexibility of the labor market as an operational leverage of the economy  
We  assume  two  production  factors:  L  for  labor  and  K  for  physical  capital.  Total 
expenditures for labor and capital equal the gross domestic product (Y). 
1. Y=L+K 
Assume that the total expenditure for labor is L 
αY + A = L  
Where: 
A = The fixed cost of labor. When employment protection (EP) in a given country is higher, A is 
higher as well. 
αY  = The variable cost of labor   
Y = The gross domestic product (GDP) 
α = The propensity to increase expenditures for labor as the GDP increases 
 
The total expenditure on capital is K. Therefore: 
K = αY) + (A Y −  
In order to keep the capital working, it should be paid at least it alternative cost- 
* K . Therefore, 
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Equation 3 demonstrates that the higher the fixed labor costs (A), the greater the sensitivity of the 
return on capital in relation to changes in the GDP. Thus, when a negative exogenous shock such 
as a world crisis takes  place, the negative effects on the economy will be stronger, meaning 
greater unemployment. More firms may decide to close their business or move their capital to 
other countries. Such decisions will negatively affect the GDP due to the multiplier effect, thereby 
escalating the crisis.  
We can consider this situation on the micro level as well. Assume that each firm has a 
different 
*
i k .  In such a case, we can express the micro problem as:  )
y
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. The first firms that would shut down their business as a result of a decline in 
the GDP would be those whose sales have a strong correlation with the GDP  (i.e. 
∂ yi
∂Y  is 
relatively high) and also have a low primary 
* 0
i k ki −  . Bear in mind that each firm that shuts   
down  its  business  or  reduces  the  scope  of  its  activity  creates  a  negative  effect  that  is  then 
compounded by the multiplier effect. Thus, on the macro level, the effect would be cumulative 
and far stronger. 
 
Inflexibility of the labor market as an automatic stabilizer of disposable income 
In a labor market characterized by weaker employment protection, job losses occur more 
quickly (Dolls et al., 2009). We should bear in mind that companies do not take into consideration 
the negative effect that such layoffs may have on the economy as a whole (such as a decline in 
disposable income, which reduces aggregate demand). If they did consider the effect of their local 
actions on the macro level, they might wait before laying off workers until they had determined 
whether the situation was temporary or permanent. Therefore, when employment protection is 
stronger, the negative external effects of laying off workers during a negative exogenous shock to 
the economy (a reduction in aggregate demand) will be weaker. In such a case, employment 
protection actually plays a role as an automatic stabilizer.  
Taken together, the two effects described above imply that the total effect of employment 
protection (EP) on abnormal unemployment (ABU) during a negative exogenous shock to the 
economy  is  a  U-shaped  curve.  Such  a  curve  suggests  that  a  medium  level  of  employment 
protection  is  most  desirable  during  a  negative  exogenous  shock  to  the  economy.  Figure  1 






   
Figure 1: Abnormal Unemployment (ABU) and Employment Protection (EP) 
 
In this paper we analyze additional two variables: the share of the government in the GDP 
and the level of economic globalization.  As Malul et al. (2011) suggested governments might 
play a stabilizing role during economic crises. For example, when all other things are equal, the 
decline in the GDP of a country in which the government plays a major role as a provider of value 
added services might be lower than in a country where the government does not play such a role. 
The reason for the difference is that private businesses are much more sensitive to decreases in 
demand than the public sector.  
To demonstrate this point, let us define Equation 4 as:   
                        4.   G p Y + Y = Y  
      where  p Y   = The value added by the business sector 
     and  G Y  =  The value added by the public sector 
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   The underlying assumption is that  p Y  is much more sensitive to changes in the world GDP 
than  G Y . Therefore, as  β increases, the total change in the GDP as a result of changes in the 
world GDP will be lower
1. 
Second, our model predicts that the more integrated the economy of the country is with 
the world economy, the stronger the correlation between the local GDP and the world economy. 
From the basic macro model we know that:  
                                                   NX + G + I + C = GDP   
where C is private consumption, I is investment, G is public consumption and NX is net 
exports.   
                                                GDP) f(World = NX  
Our model predicts that as the share of NX in the GDP rises, the stronger the effect of world 
crises on the local GDP. The model also predicts that countries with either high or low levels of 
employment protection will experience higher rates of abnormal unemployment (compared to 
countries with medium levels of employment protection) during an exogenous negative shock to 
the economy. In the next section, we will use data from the recent world crisis to determine the 
accuracy of this prediction.  
 
Empirical analysis 
The recent global economic crisis has been one of the most severe and deep economic 
crises in history (Friedrich and Kirchgässner, 2009). The most important economies, such as those 
of the United States, China and Britain, are in deep recession. In a globalized world, such a 
situation may have a negative impact on many other economies as well. We will construct an 
                                             
1   We should note that our model is not a general equilibrium model, so it is not designed to explain all of the 
macro economic effects.   
empirical model to test our hypothesis about the relationship between employment protection and 
levels of unemployment in the face of a negative exogenous shock to a country’s economy. 
 
The empirical model:  
GLOB) G, f(EP, = ABU  
Dependent variable:  
Abnormal unemployment (ABU): This variable measures abnormal unemployment in a 
country in relation to the unemployment rate before the crisis. In this case, specifically, it 




Employment Protection (EP): We used the OECD indicators of employment protection, 
which are synthetic indicators of the strictness of regulations about dismissals and the use 
of temporary contracts.  
 
Controls: 
Government  (G):  The  average  share  of  government  expenditures  out  of  the  GDP. 
Specifically, we measured the average share of government expenditures out of the GDP 
for each country for the years 1998-2007. We calculated this variable as a dummy variable 
for each country whose government’s share in the economy was higher than the median 
index  (34.77%).  Any  country  meeting  this  criterion  was  defined  as  a  country  with  a 
relatively high share of government in the GDP  (value of dummy=1). All other countries 
were considered countries with a relatively low share of government in the GDP (value of 
dummy=0).   
Economic Globalization (GLOB): We used the KOF Index of Economic Globalization, 
which measures long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information 
and perceptions that accompany market exchanges (Dreher, 2006).  
We calculated this variable as a dummy variable for each country whose government’s 
share in the economy was higher than the median index (82.55). Any country meeting this 
criterion was defined as a country that was relatively highly integrated into the world 
economy (value of dummy=1). All other countries were considered countries that were 
relatively less integrated into the world economy (value of dummy=0). 
 
Sample 
Our sample includes all of the 33 OECD countries. The data for unemployment rates and 
the  stickiness  of  the  labor  market  were  collected  from  the  OECD  database.  The  data  for 
government  expenses  were  collected  from  the  World  Bank  (world  development  indicator). 




Table 1: Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Unemployment Rate 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t 
Intercept  2.24  2.18**  5.03  3.09*** 
GLOB  1.23  1.77*  1.58  2.34** 
G  -2.27  -3.24***  -1.67  -2.33** 
EP  0.17  0.41  -3.76  -1.99* 
EP
2      0.96  2.13** 
  F=4.14**,   
N=33  
Adjusted Rsquare 0.227 
F=4.62***  
N=33 
Adjusted Rsquare  0.312 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
We  ran  the  data  through  two  different  models.  Model  1  assumes  a  linear  effect  of 
employment  protection  on  abnormal  unemployment.  Model  2  assumes  a  U-shaped  effect  of 
employment  protection  on  abnormal  unemployment.  Our  results  suggest  that  the  impact  of 
employment protection on abnormal unemployment is not linear.  Model 2 explains about 31% of 
the variation in the abnormal unemployment rate during a worldwide recession. The U-shaped 
pattern of behavior for employment protection indicates that when employment protection is very 
low or high, the effect on unemployment will be stronger. Economies with an intermediate level 
of employment protection will be more stable during a world crisis. The logic behind these results 
is that when employment protection is relatively high, companies do not have the ability to deal 
with  declines  in  sales  by  cutting  costs,  for  example,  by  laying  off  workers,  so  their  risk  of 
bankruptcy will be higher. Therefore, when the exogenous shock is significant, many firms will 
go  bankrupt,  leading  to  a  sharp,  negative  decline  in  the  scope  of  economic  activity.  The 
theoretical model we presented in the previous section supports this effect. 
On the other hand, when employment protection is very low, firms may over react by 
cutting costs  (i.e., firing workers) in response to decreasing sales. Such a response may  also 
happen as a result of panic or myopia, and exacerbate the situation by further reducing aggregate 
demand.  In  such  a  case,  increasing  employment  protection  may  strengthen  the  ability  of  the 
economy  to  cope  with  the  business  cycle.  Thus,  on  the  macro  level,  a  medium  level  of 
employment protection may act as an automatic stabilizer.  
To further illustrate our results, we divided our sample into two groups. The first group included 
countries with very low and very high levels of employment protection (the first and last quartiles 
of our sample). The former included countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
The  latter  included  countries  such  as  Spain,  Turkey  and  Chile.  The  second  group  included 
countries with a medium level of employment protection (the second and third quartiles of our 
sample) such as Sweden, the Netherlands and South Korea.    
Table 2: Differences in Abnormal Unemployment   
  Medium EP  High and Low EP 
Mean abnormal unemployment  1.01  2.83 
Std.  1.15  2.57 
Observations  16  17 
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.007   
 
  We can see from Table 2 that when the employment protection level is medium, abnormal 
unemployment is relatively low (1.01). In contrast, when the level of employment protection is 
very  low  or  very  high,  abnormal  unemployment  is  relatively  high  (2.83).  The  difference  is 
significant at the 1% level. 
Delving deeper into the labor market attributes using OECD statistics, we looked at government 
policies in this area and divided them into active and passive policies. Active policies include 
training programs and employment incentives. Passive policies include unemployment benefits 
and early retirement. We found that active policies are negatively  correlated with the rate of 
abnormal unemployment (-0.027, not significant), while passive policies are positively correlated 
with unemployment (0.345, significant at the 10% level). 
As for the other explanatory variables, the results are as expected. In accordance with the findings 
of Malul et al. (2011), when the government is a larger part of a country's GDP, world crises have 
less of an effect on the country's economy because the government plays a stabilizing role when 
activity  in  the  business  sector  declines.  Second,  the  sign  of  the  globalization  coefficient  is 
positive, indicating that the more globalized a country's economy, the more significant the impact 
of  a  world  crisis  on  the  country's  economy.  This  effect  will  be  reflected  in  higher  abnormal 
employment rates. Such results are in line with studies that have found that globalization may 
increase the instability of local economies (Stach, 2008).   
 
 
   
Conclusions 
  This  paper  explores  the  role  of  employment  protection  during  a  negative  shock  to  a 
country’s economy stemming from external sources. We first present a theoretical framework that 
shows that employment protection has a U-shaped effect on abnormal unemployment during an 
exogenous negative shock to an economy. Using data from the 33 OECD countries, we analyzed 
how the level of employment protection affected the stability of unemployment rates during an 
external shock to the economic system such as that caused by the recent global economic crisis.  
  The results suggest that countries with an intermediate level of employment protection 
will  be  more  stable  during  a  world  crisis.  For  counties  with  medium  levels  of  employment 
protection (for example, Sweden and the Netherlands), unemployment increased by about 1%, 
while for countries with relatively high levels of job security (for example, Spain and Chile) or 
relatively  low  levels  of  job  security  (for  example,  Canada  and  the  USA),  the  increase  in 
unemployment was higher (about 3%). 
  Finally, using OECD statistics we analyzed how labor market policies affect the economic 
response to a world crisis. We found that passive labor market policies such as unemployment 
benefits  may  increase  abnormal  unemployment  rates,  while  active  policies  such  as  training 
programs and employment incentives may reduce abnormal unemployment rates caused by global 
economic crises. 
  The  policy  implication  of  our  paper  is  that  countries  should  seek  a  medium  level  of 
employment protection that would act as an automatic stabilizer in trying economic times. A low 
level of employment protection may prompt employers to layoff vast numbers of employees as a 
result of panic or myopia. Doing so only exacerbates the problems in the economy at large. Thus, 
increasing  employment  protection  to  a  medium  level  is  Pareto  efficient.  On  the  other  hand, 
countries with a relatively high level of employment protection should reduce it to a medium   
level,  because  guaranteeing  job  security  hampers  the  ability  of  the  economy  to  cope  with 
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